The United States Court of International Trade: Will It Ever Be Understood by Tucker, Karl Richard
Masthead Logo Global Business & Development Law Journal
Volume 2 | Issue 1 Article 12
1-1-1989
The United States Court of International Trade:
Will It Ever Be Understood
Karl Richard Tucker
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/globe
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Global Business & Development Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Karl R. Tucker, The United States Court of International Trade: Will It Ever Be Understood, 2 Transnat'l Law. 225 (1989).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/globe/vol2/iss1/12
The United States Court of International
Trade: Will It Ever Be Understood?
INTRODUCTION
Since its inception in 1980, the United States Court of International
Trade has been experiencing an identity crisis.' Although this can
partially be explained by its relative "newness" on the international
trade scene, a large part of its identity crisis can be tied directly to
the fact that potential litigants as well as practicing attorneys know
very little about the court's purpose and importance in international
trade litigation.2 This article analyzes the relationship between the
United States Court of International Trade (CIT), the International
Trade Administration (ITA), and the International Trade Commission
(ITC).3 The analysis focuses on two areas of legal controversy which
recently assumed positions of prominence in CIT jurisprudence. These
two areas are the CIT's review and alleged deference to Commerce
Department antidumping decisions and the CIT's use of residual
1. Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 201, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980).
2. For an analysis of jurisdictional related problems of the Court of International Trade
[hereinafter Ct. Int'l Trade or CITI, see generally Cohen, Recent Decisions of the Court of
International Trade Relating to Jurisdiction and Procedure: A Review, 18 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L
Bus., v-vii, 1-277 (1986); Re, Presumption of Judicial Review, 10 B.C. INT'L & Com L.Rv.,
173 (1987) [hereinafter Re] (general discussion of the CIT's power of judicial review and
function the court serves on international trade scene).
3. See generally Mordhorst, International Trade Administration v. International Trade
Commission: The Scope of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations, 9 GEo.
MAsoN U. L. REV. 147 (1986) (discussing the relationship between the ITA, ITC, and CIT);
see also Re, supra note 2, at 174. (discussing the CIT's power of judicial review). See generally
3 J. PATTrsoN, Arirn=UmPno AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS 1-11 (1984) [hereinafter
PATnrsoN] (discussing the relationship between the ITA and the ITC). Although the ITA (which
is a part of the United States Commerce Department) and the ITC are separate and distinct
administrative agencies, for clarity purposes this article will refer to them together as the
Commerce Department and will only delineate between the ITA and ITC where appropriate.
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jurisdiction. 4 The activities of the CIT in these areas are of particular
importance because it serves to define the CIT's scope of judicial
review of Commerce Department determinations.
The central purpose of this discussion is to provide the practitioner
with an understanding of why the CIT is an important forum for
the resolution of international trade problems. The first part of this
comment provides general background material on the CIT, the ITA,
and the ITC. The background focuses in part on historical devel-
opment of the CIT, thereby providing salient insight into the impor-
tance of the court today. Since the primary focus of the CIT in the
1980s has been the review of Commerce Department antidumping
determinations, the background section also contains an exhaustive
analysis of the process by which antidumping determinations mate-
rialize. Furthermore, because the CIT has the power to review
preliminary findings made by the Commerce Department, knowledge
of this process is paramount in acquiring a complete understanding
of the CIT's power of judicial review.' The second section discusses
recent case law development regarding the purported deference by
the CIT to Commerce Department determinations. The final section
of this comment analyzes the use of residual jurisdiction by the CIT
and recent decisions addressing this issue. By referring back to points
developed in this comment, the conclusion will attempt to provide
the transnational practitioner with insight into the future direction
of the CIT. By examining recent developments in the CIT and how
the court's power of judicial review has come to be defined, this
comment will also provide the transnational practitioner with a
working knowledge of the limits upon the CIT's scope of review.
I. THE UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE
COMMERCE DEPARTMENT
A. The Court of International Trade
1. Preliminary Matters
Title VII of the Tariff Act of 19306 established a bifurcated system
within the Commerce Department in which the International Trade
4. See Kennedy, Judicial Review of Commerce Department Antidumping Duty Deter-
minations: Deference or Abdication?, 11 N.C. INT'L L.J. & COM. REG., 19, 20 (1986)
[hereinafter Kennedy] (discussing CIT deference to Commerce Department determinations];
Nakajima All Co. Ltd. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 52 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988) (discussing
residual jurisdiction of the Ct. Int'l Trade).
5. See supra text accompanying note 66.
6. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).226
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Administration and the International Trade Commission (hereafter
referred to jointly as the Commerce Department)7 review problems
arising out of Congressional legislation affecting international trade.
Their most important duties include the administration of antidump-
ing laws passed by the United States Congress.8 As a general economic
concept, "dumping" is the sale of a commodity in another country
for less than the cost of that commodity in the country where it was
produced. 9 Injury to domestic industry results when dumping occurs
because the domestic industry is unfairly undersold by foreign man-
ufacturers willing to sell at a loss in order to capture the domestic
market. 10 In this connection, the CIT has given fervent attention to
antidumping complaints filed by both foreign and domestic parties
who are unsatisfied with Commerce Department determinations in
this area. This comment tracks an antidumping complaint through
the determination process, pointing out the different junctures at
which the CIT may review Commerce Department determinations. It
is important to note that the CIT does not deal exclusively with
antidumping problems." However, a discussion of the role of the
CIT in areas other than antidumping is beyond the scope of this
comment.
2. Introduction
The United States Congress created the U.S. Court of International
Trade (CIT) in 1980 as the successor to the U.S. Customs Court.' 2
The legislative mandate of the CIT stresses that the court is to
provide parties adversely affected by actions of United States gov-
ernment agencies in the area of international trade with the same
access to judicial review and judicial remedies as are available to
persons aggrieved by domestic agency actions.13 The CIT is not like
7. Despite the fact that the ITA and the ITC are separate agencies, under the mandate
of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 the two agencies act together in the administration of
antidumping and countervailing duty law. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39,
93 Stat. 151 (1979) [hereinafter TAA of 1979].
8. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
9. PATTISON, supra note 3, at 1-3.
10. Id. at 1-8. A report from the U.S. House of Representatives on the 1921 Antidumping
Act stated that antidumping law "was designed to protect our industries and labor against a
now common species of commercial warfare of dumping goods at less than cost or home
value if necessary until our industries are destroyed . . . ." Id.
11. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581-1582 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The CIT also deals with determi-
nations made by the Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Treasury and
numerous other civil actions as delineated within the statutes. Id.
12. Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 201, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980).
13. Re, supra note 2, at 174. Agency actions include those agencies like the ITA and ITC
that are charged with the administration of the nation's international trade laws. Id. Interna-
tional trade issues include, but are not limited to, antidumping, countervailing duties, trademark
infringement, import restrictions, and copyright registration. Id. 227
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other federal courts because it does not resolve disputes between
private parties. 14 Instead, it reviews a wide variety of actions by
agencies such as the ITA and the ITC which administer U.S. inter-
national trade laws. 15 The following subsections trace the evolution
of the CIT to its present standing as an integral part of the United
States federal judicial system.
3. The Early Years
Although the CIT provides a forum for the review of agency
determinations, the role of the court in administering international
trade laws is only clear from an examination of events that occurred
before its inception in 1980.16 The CIT had its beginning in 1890 as
the Board of General Appraisers (Board).1 7 The Board was responsible
for the review of decisions made by officials of the United States
Customs Bureau establishing duties 8 on merchandise imported into
the United States. 19 In 1926, Congress abolished the Board of General
Appraisers and established the United States Customs Court. 20 As a
general matter, the Customs Court was given no additional powers
over and beyond the powers wielded by the Board. 2'
In 1956, Congress declared that the Customs Court was a court
"established under Article III of the Constitution of the United
States" but failed to provide it with a statutory definition of its
powers. 22 By 1970 Congress realized that the Customs Court was in
need of significant procedural revisions. 23 These revisions were needed
due to a significant increase in the amount of imports into the United
States along with a more aggressive attitude on the part of American
importers and manufacturers in challenging Customs Bureau deci-
sions.2 As a consequence, the burden on the Customs Court had
14. Id.
15. Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 201, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980).
16. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., 3729, 3731 (1980).
17. Id. at 3729.
18. The term "Duties" defines a "Tax on imports ... as including all manner of taxes,
charges, or governmental impositions." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 453 (5th ed. 1979).
19. H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 16, at 3729.
20. Id. at 3730.
21. Id. The Court, by authority of Congress, was empowered to review decisions by
Customs officials regarding the rate and amount of duty imposed on imported merchandise,
as well as the value of such merchandise (i.e., valuation and classification). Id. at 3729.
22. H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 16, at 3730.
23. Id.
24. H.R. RP. No. 267, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 3192 (1970).
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increased tremendously. 25 To alleviate this burden, Congress passed
the Customs Courts Act of 1970 (1970 Act) which implemented the
much needed procedural reforms. 26 One of the major procedural
changes that occurred as a result of the 1970 Act involved the amount
of issues the Customs Court could handle in a single action. 27 Before
the 1970 Act was passed, questions of valuation and classification
of a single entry of merchandise into the United States could not be
resolved together in a single proceeding.n Instead, both questions
were dealt with in separate proceedings. 29 With the advent of the
1970 Act, all issues regarding the same merchandise could be resolved
in one proceeding.30
The 1970 Act left unresolved the substantive issues regarding the
jurisdiction and powers of the Customs Court. 31 The 1970 Act failed
to provide the Customs Court with the ability to award monetary or
injunctive relief to litigants. 32 Essentially, the Customs Court could
only agree or disagree with an agency determination. The 1970 Act
also failed to provide the Customs Court with a well defined juris-
dictional statement as to the types of actions which it could review. 3
25. Id. The Customs Court received 35,000 new cases in fiscal year 1963. By fiscal year
1969, the number grew to more than 75,000 cases. During this same period, the rate of
termination of cases increased from an annual average of 32,000 between fiscal years 1963
and 1966, to almost 49,000 in fiscal year 1969. Despite this increase in productivity, with new
cases substantially exceeding the rate of terminations, the court has been faced with a growing
backlog of pending cases. In fiscal year 1963 these amounted to 186,452. In fiscal year 1969,
the backlog increased to 431,612 cases. Id. at 3192.
26. H.R. REp. No. 267, supra note 24, at 3191.
27. Id. at 3192.
28. See infra note 34 and accompanying text for a discussion of valuation and classification
of goods.
29. H.R. REP. No. 267, supra note 24, at 3194.
30. Customs Courts Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-271 (1970).
31. H.R. REp. No. 267, supra note 24, at 3191. The stated purpose of the 1970 Act was
to modify the judicial procedures in the Customs Court. Titles I, II, and III of the Act
established "up-to-date" procedures in the Customs Court for conducting customs litigation.
Id.; see also H.R. RP. No. 1235, supra note 16, at 3730 (stating that the focus of the 1970
Act was procedural reform).
32. H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 16, at 3730. Bureau decisions made in error could
cause monetary damages to parties, but the Court had no authority to award such remedies.
The only remedy available through the Court was an affirmative order to change or modify
the decision. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 and the Customs Courts Act of 1980 were
passed in an effort to correct the Court's general lack of remedial powers. Id.
33. H.R. Rap. No. 1235, supra note 16, at 3730; see also Customs Courts Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-271, § 110 (1970) which states in relevant part:
(a) The Customs Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions instituted by
any person whose protest lursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, has been
denied, in whole or in part, by the appropriate customs officer, where the admin-
istrative decision, including the legality of all orders and findings entering into the
same, involves: (1) the appraised value of merchandise; (2) the classification and
229
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These omissions had the effect of confusing potential litigants who
did not know if the Customs Court had jurisdiction to entertain or
provide a proper remedy for their case.34
4. The Trade Agreement Act of 1979: Expanding the Remedial
Powers of the Customs Court
Prior to and during the early part of the 1970s the Customs Court
primarily heard classification and valuation cases.3" However, during
the 1970s the Court moved away from hearing these types of cases
and focused on cases dealing with antidumping and countervailing
duty issues.3 6 In response to this shift in focus, Congress passed the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (1979 Act).
With the adoption of the 1979 Act, Congress set out to rectify
limitations on the Customs Court's remedial powers. The 1979 Act,
for the first time, provided the Customs Court with the ability to
grant injunctive relief while the court reviewed a Commerce Depart-
ment determination. 37 The Customs Court could now enjoin the
Commerce Department from enforcing its determination on a matter
until after the Customs Court had reviewed the issue. 8 However, the
rate and amount of duties chargeable; (3) all charges qr exactions of whatever
character within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury; (4) the exclusion
of merchandise from entry or delivery under any provisions of the customs laws;
(5) the liquidation or reliquidation of an entry, or a modification thereof; (6) the
refusal to pay a claim for drawback; or (7) the refusal to reliquidate an entry under
section 520(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended....
Id.
34. H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 16, at 3730. For example, a party may bring an
action protesting the amount of duties placed upon their product by Customs officials pursuant
to Section 110. However, if the court deemed that the duty was exorbitant and that as a
result, the protesting party was injured, the court could not enjoin the Customs Bureau from
continuing to access the duty nor could it provide monetary relief to the injured party. This
is where the confusion to potential litigants rested - while the court may have jurisdiction over
the matter it was essentially powerless to rectify any problems. Thus, many litigants sought
relief in district courts where the possibility of receiving an effective remedy existed. Id.
35. H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 16, at 3730. See also H.R. RP. No. 267, supra note
24, at 3194. Goods arriving in the United States are subject to examination by the Customs
Bureau. First, an official of the Customs Bureau appraises the value of a product using the
best available information (valuation). Subsequently, the official classifies the product under
United States tariff schedules (classification) which is used to calculate the amount of duty.
Id.
36. See generally H.R. REp. No. 1235, supra note 16, at 3730. Negotiations between
countries began to alleviate the need for direct placement of tariff duties upon imported goods.
This caused a decrease in valuation and classification cases and an increase in antidumping
and countervailing duty cases. Id.
37. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 516, 93 Stat. 151 (1979).
38. Id. See generally Industrial Fasteners Group, American Importers Association, v.
United States, 495 F. Supp. 911 (Cust. Ct. 1980) (first time the Customs Court applied its
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The 1980 Act abolished the Customs Court and created the current
Court of International Trade.44 In the 1980 Act, Congress perfected
the status of the CIT as a court established under Article III of the
United States Constitution and provided the CIT with all the nec-
essary remedial powers45 in law and equity possessed by other federal
courts established under the same article.46 Section 201 of the 1980
Act provides the CIT with exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions
filed against the United States or its agencies and officers which
concern international trade.47
44. Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 501, 94 Stat. 1727, (1980). This
section amends title 28 to reflect the change in name from Customs Court to the Court of
International Trade. Id.
45. Id. As with other federal courts under Article III, the CIT has the power to hear
cases arising under the United States Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties
made with other countries. However, the court's power extends only to trade issues that arise
under any of the above categories. Id.
46. Article III of the United States Constitution provides that "The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (emphasis
added); See also, H.R. RaP. No. 1235, supra note 16, at 3731. while the court was given
Article III status in 1956, the 1980 Act perfected that status by codifying its authority. The
court now can provide the same remedies and perform the same functions of the other federal
courts established under Article III. See supra note 44.
47. See Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 201, 94 Stat. 1727, (1980);
See also 28 U.S.C. § 1581 which states in relevant part:
(a) The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil
action commenced to contest the denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under
section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
(b) ... any civil action commenced under 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
(c) ... any civil action commenced under 516a of the tariff Act of 1930.
(d) ... any civil action commenced to review (1) any final determination of the
Secretary of Labor under § 223 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979...
(2) any final determination by the Secretary of Commerce under § 251 of the
Trade Act of 1974...
(e) ... any civil action commenced to review any final determination of the
Secretary of the Treasury under § 305(b)(1) of the Trade Agreements Act of
1979 ....
(f) ... any civil action involving an application for an order directing the
administering authority(ITA) or the International Trade Commission to make con-
fidential information available under § 777(c)(2) or Tariff Act of 1930....
(g) ... any civil action commenced to review (1) any decision of the Secretary of
Treasury under § 641(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930...
(2) any order of the Secretary of the Treasury under § 641(b) of the Tariff Act
of 1930 ....
(h) ... any civil action commenced to review.... a ruling issued by the Secretary
of the Treasury relating to classification, valuation, rate of duty .... but only if
the party commencing the civil action demonstrates to the court that he would be
irreparably harmed unless given an opportunity to obtain judicial review...
(i) ... that arises out of any law of the United States providing for-
(1) revenue from imports or tonnage;
(2) tariffs, duties, fees.., on the importation of merchandise...
(3) embargoes on the importation of merchandise ....
Id.
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1979 Act failed to provide a definitive jurisdictional statement as to
the types of matters the Customs Court could review. 39
Many potential litigants were effectively precluded from acquiring
judicial determinations because the federal district courts lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to review the agency rulings. 40 Essentially,
litigants were unsure as to whether their case fell within the jurisdic-
tion of the Customs Court or were not willing to litigate in a court
that could do little more than agree or disagree with the Commerce
Department's determination. 4' As a result, many litigants sought
redress from agency rulings in other federal district courts because
of the uncertain jurisdictional bases and limited remedial powers of
the Customs Court. 42
5. The Customs Courts Act of 1980: Creation of the Court of
International Trade
Congress addressed the above discussed jurisdictional and remedial
problems by passing the Customs Courts Act of 1980 (1980 Act). 43
power to issue a preliminary injunction by authority of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979);
Alberta Gas Chemicals, Inc. v. United states, 496 F. Supp. 1332 (Cust. Ct. 1980) (The Court
issued an injunction not under its power given by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 but
instead by using 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), known as the "All Writs Act".)
39. See supra note 38; see also H.R. RaP. No. 1235, supra note 16, at 3730. The legislative
history indicates that the purpose of the Act is to "modernize the judicial procedures in the
Customs Court and the related administrative processes in the Bureau of Customs so as to
enable these agencies to cope more effectively and expeditiously with their rapidly expanding
workload." Id. Obviously, the 1970 Act was not intended to alleviate the need for a well
defined statement of the Court's jurisdiction. Id.
40. H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 16, at 3730; For cases which show the frustration
that some litigants experienced due to their actions being dismissed from federal courts for
want of jurisdiction, see J.C. Penney Co. v. United States Treasury Dept., 439 F.2d 63 (2d
Cir. 1971), (dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Cottman Co. v. Dailey, 94
F.2d 85 (D.D.C. 1938) (pointing out that the plaintiff's claim that the denial of a proper
review of the appraisals of their product was false since the Customs Court had already ruled
on that issue); North American Cement Corp. v. Anderson, 284 F.2d 591 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
(plaintiffs sought declaratory relief against the Commissioner of Customs. The case was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction with the court pointing out that the Customs Court had
jurisdiction over the matter); Horton v. Humphry, 146 F.Supp 819 (D.D.C. 1956) (dismissing
plaintiffs claim that the Antidumping Act was unconstitutional); SCM Corporation v. United
States International Trade Commission, 404 F. Supp. 124 (D.D.C. 1975) (District court
dismissed a challenge to ITC injury determination due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction
stating the Customs court could provide an adequate remedy.)
41. H.R. RaP. No. 1235, supra note 16, at 3731.
42. Id.; See generally, H.R. RaP. No. 267, supra note 24, at 3195. Prior to the advent
of the CIT, the Customs Court primarily handled cases involving the valuation and classification
of goods by the Bureau of Customs. Parties opposed to the Bureau's determinations on the
value of their product and the ensuing classification of the product for tariff purposes could
seek redress in the Customs Court. Interestingly, all the court could do was agree or disagree
with the Customs Bureau's determination. The Customs Court had no power to provide the
litigant with any kind of relief.
43. Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 201, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980).
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1581). See infra, note 46.
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Under Section 201 of the 1980 Act, 4 Congress afforded the CIT
with a definitive jurisdictional statement focused on more contem-
poraneous international trade issues such as antidumping and coun-
tervailing duties instead of issues regarding valuation and
classification. 49 The result is an expansion of the jurisdiction beyond
that possessed by the predecessor Customs Court. The 1980 Act5"
also refined the CIT's power to provide specific remedies such as
injunctive and monetary relief.51 As a result, litigants who only a
few years ago would have sought redress in other federal district
courts can now effectively utilize the CIT as a forum for their
international trade grievances. Consequently, because the CIT is an
effective forum it is able to reduce the burden on other already
overburdened federal courts.5 2 More importantly, the U.S. Court of
International Trade is now able to carry out its legislative mandate
to "provide persons adversely affected or aggrieved by agency actions
arising out of import transactions with the same access to judicial
review and judicial remedies as are available to persons aggrieved by
other agency actions. 53
B. The Commerce Department: Antidumping Regulatory Agency
1. Introduction
The first antidumping statutes were enacted in the early 1900s. The
first country to promulgate an antidumping statute was Canada in
190454 and soon, other countries followed 55 including the United
48. Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 201, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980).
49. For text of 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see supra note 46; see also 19
U.S.C. § 1516a. (This statute expressly provides for the judicial review of countervailing duty
and antidumping duty proceedings). See supra note 7 for a statement of the purpose of
antidumping law.
50. The CIT's power to act under Section 301 of the 1980 Act is codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2643 and is stated in pertinent part, infra note 51.
51. See 28 U.S.C. § 2643 (1982) which provides:
(a) The Court of International Trade may enter a money judgment- (c)(1) ....
(or) order any other form of relief that is appropriate in a civil action, including,
but not limited to, declaratory judgments, orders of remand, injunctions, and writs
of mandamus and prohibition.
Id.
52. H.R. RaP. No. 1235, supra note 16, at 3731.
53. See Re, supra note 2, at 174.
54. PATnisoz, supra note 3, at 1-3. In response to overzealous American traders, Canada
adopted its statute in 1904. Id.
55. Id. at 1-3 n.1. Other countries included were New Zealand, South Africa, and
Australia. Id.
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States which enacted its first antidumping statute in 1916.56 Originally,
enforcement of the antidumping statutes was the responsibility of
the United States Treasury Department.5 7 Today, enforcement of
antidumping law is the responsibility of the International Trade
Administration and the International Trade Commission .5  The ITA
determines whether or not a violation of antidumping law has oc-
curred while the ITC determines whether or not the American in-
dustry has been injured by a violation.5 9 Within this bifurcated
system, both agencies work together in the administration of anti-
dumping lawA°
2. The Process of Coming to an Antidumping Determination
Interested parties61 first file a complaint with the ITA as the
"administering authority" of the Commerce Department. 62 However,
before the ITA concludes its investigation into whether any substan-
tive violation of antidumping law has occurred, the ITC makes a
preliminary determination as to whether any actual injury to a
domestic manufacturer has resulted from the foreign dumping of
goods in the United States.63 The ITC's preliminary investigation is
completely separate from the ITA's investigation and focuses on
whether there is any "reasonable indication" 64 that a United States
56. Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 801, 39 Stat. 798-99 (1916) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. 72 (1982)).
57. PAT-risON, supra note 3, at 1-11 n. 16.
58. Id. at 1-11. Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, antidumping actions proceed
through both the ITA (Commerce Department) and the ITC. Id.
59. Id. at 2-2.
60. Id. Antidumping law is codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
61. "Interested Party" is defined in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) as:
(A) a foreign manufacturer, producer, or exporter, or the United States importer,
of merchandise which is the subject of an investigation under this title or a trade
or business association a majority of the members of which are importers of such
merchandise. Id.
62. "Administering Authority" is defined at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(1) (1982).
"(1) ... The term 'administering authority' means the Secretary of the Treasury, or any
other officer of the United States to whom the responsibility for carrying out the duties of
the administering authority under this title are transferred by law." Id. See also 19 C.F.R. §
207.2 (1988). Parties seeking reprieve from dumping file a complaint with the ITA as the
"administering authority" alleging that a foreign manufacturer is dumping goods in the United
States and that such dumping is materially injuring them. Id.
63. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (1982) provides that the ITC must begin its preliminary injury
determination investigation "Within 45 days after the date on which a petition is filed with
the ITA or on which it receives notice from the administering authority of a commenced
investigation." Id. See also 19 C.F.R. § 207.2(i) (1988).
64. Avesta AB v. United States, 689 F. Supp. 1173, 1175 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988). The
Agency determination must have a reasonable and rational basis in fact designed to "weed
out" those cases clearly without merit. Id.
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industry is materially injured or threatened with material injury or
that the establishment of an industry is materially retarded by reason
of imported merchandise. 5 If the ITC finds no "reasonable indica-
tion" of injury, the entire investigation, including that of the ITA's,
terminates. 6 If the ITC determines that there is a "reasonable
indication" of injury, the ITA is allowed to continue its investiga-
tion.67 Essentially, whether or not the ITA continues its investigation
depends on the outcome of the ITC's preliminary injury investigation.
The United States Court of International Trade can review the
ITC's preliminary injury determination.6 Once the petitioner files
for review, the ITA must discontinue its investigation until the CIT
disposes of the appeal.6 9 This policy allows the petitioner to delay
further investigation and spares foreign producers from compliance
with different duty obligations7 within the same general investiga-
tion.71
For example, if the ITC came to a positive preliminary injury
determination, the ITA would be free to continue with its investi-
gation. Should the ITA determine that, in fact, a foreign producer
was dumping its products in the United States, the ITA would then
65. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (1982).
66. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (1982) provides: "If that [preliminary injury] determination is
negative, the investigation shall be terminated." The ITA's investigation will be allowed to
continue if the ITC's preliminary injury determination is in the positive. Id.
67. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Essentially, the ITA cannot make its
preliminary determination of whether an antidumping violation has occurred unless the ITC
has first made its preliminary injury determination. Id. The reason for this is that while a
substantive violation of antidumping law might well have occurred, unless there is injury to a
domestic industry as a result of that violation there is no reason to proceed with the
investigation. This reasoning follows from the central purpose of antidumping law which is to
keep foreign business interests from destroying American industry. Therefore, unless there is
injury to domestic manufacturers as a result of a violation of antidumping law, there is no
"destroying" of American industry. If this is the case, there is no reason to continue the
investigation.
68. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) states that:
"Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no
other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review." Id.
69. Powell, Impact of the CIT on the Department of Commerce's Administration of the
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 10 B.C. INT'L & CoM L. REv. 181, 206 (1987)
[hereinafter Powell]. Domestic or foreign parties may appeal the ITC's preliminary injury
determination. Generally, parties file a complaint with the court alleging that the determination
was either unsupported by substantial evidence on the record or was not in accordance with
law. Id. For a complete discussion of this see infra notes 109-182 and accompanying text. 28
U.S.C. 2643(c)(1) allows the CIT to grant any appropriate relief including injunctions. Id.
70. Id. at 206.
71. Id. See also Melamine Chemicals, Inc. v. U.S., 732 F.2d 924, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Congress could not have intended the "yo-yo effect," i.e., liquidations that could result from
a CIT order controlling liquidations, which is later overturned on appeal, requiring the
recommencement of the original administrative determination. Id.
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place a duty upon that foreign producer. While this is occurring, the
CIT would be deliberating on the correctness of the ITC's preliminary
injury determination. As a result, the foreign producer might be
forced to pay a duty which months latter could be overturned by
the CIT if it found that the ITC's preliminary determination was
wrong. The effect of this would be an increased monetary burden
upon the foreign producer as well as a waste of the ITA's time and
resources because its final determination would be moot. Hence, the
policy that the ITA should not continue its investigation until a final
court decision has been issued is a logical one.
Upon entry of a positive preliminary injury determination by the
ITC without appeal to the CIT, the ITA proceeds with its own
investigation.7 2 If the ITA concludes after its investigation that a
domestic manufacturer is being injured as a result of foreign dump-
ing, it will impose a duty upon such foreign merchandise. 73 The ITC
then reviews the ITA determination and makes its own final deter-
mination on the matter.74 If the ITC agrees with the ITA determi-
nation, the duty stands; if it disagrees, the duty is revoked. 75 The
domestic or the foreign party may challenge either of these deter-
minations and suspend further investigation.
3. The ITC Investigation
Pursuant to Section 735(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930,76 the ITC
reviews the "record ' 77 developed in the ITA investigation before it
72. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) provides that:
".... the administering authority shall make a determination, based upon the best
information available to it at the time of the determination, of whether there is a
reasonable basis to believe or suspect that the merchandise is being sold, or is likely
to be sold, at less than fair value. If the determination ... is affirmative ... the
determination shall include the estimated average amount by which the foreign
market value exceeds the United States price."
Id. See supra text accompanying notes 59-98 for discussion on two agency's roles in process.
73. Id.
74. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) provides:
(b) Final determination by Commission. (1) In general. The Commission shall make
a final determination of whether-
(A) an industry in the United States-
(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(13) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded,
by reason of imports of the merchandise with respect to which the administering
authority has made an affirmative determination.
Id.
75. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b)(2) (1982) provides: "If the preliminary determination by the
administering authority ... is affirmative, then the Commission shall make the
determination required by paragraph (1) . That determination is the final
determination by the Commission.
Id.
76. Tariff Act of 1930, Ch. 497, Sess. II, H.R. 2667, Pub. No. 361 (June 17, 1930).
77. 19 C.F.R. § 207.2(i) (1987). The "record" is defined as:
236
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comes to its own final determination. 78 To assess whether there is
material injury to a domestic industry,79 the ITC must initially
determine what is the "like product ' 80 that is purportedly being
dumped in the United States."' If a foreign product is "substantially
similar" to a domestic product then a valid material injury assessment
in favor of the domestic industry can be made. 2
To determine whether a domestic industry is suffering material
injury from the purported dumping of a foreign product, the ITC
must also determine the condition of the domestic industry by con-
sidering such factors as the industry's capacity,8 3 the industry's util-
ization of its capacity,8 4 the actual amount of the industry's
production, 5 how much of its product the industry ships out,8 6 the
extent of the industry's inventories,87 how many people the industry
77. 19 C.F.R. § 207.2(i) (1987). The "record" is defined as:
All information presented to or obtained by the Commission during the course of
a proceeding, including completed questionnaires, information obtained from the
administering authority, written communications from any party, recommended
findings of fact by the Director of Operations, staff reports ....
Id.
78. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) states:
(c) Effect of final determinations. (1) Effect of affirmative determination by the
administering authority. If the determination of the administering authority under
subsection (a) is affirmative, then-
(A) the administering authority shall make available to the Commission
all information upon which such determination was based and which the
Commission considers relevant to its determination .....
Id.
79. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The term "industry" is defined as
"the domestic producers as a whole of a like product, or those producers whose collective
output of the like product constitutes a major portion of the total domestic production of the
product." Id.
80. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10) (1982). The term "like product" is defined as "a product which
is like, or in the absence of like, most similar in characteristics and uses with, the (domestic)
article under investigation." Id.
81. Color Picture Tubes From Canada, Japan, The Republic of Korea, and Singapore,
USITC Pub. 2046, Inv. No. 731-TA-367, at 3 (December 1987) [hereinafter Color Picture
Tubes].
82. PATsoN, supra note 3, at 3-4. The product must be similar or the comparison of
the fair market value of the foreign product against the fair market value of the domestic
product would be useless for antidumping purposes. Only similar items can affect each other
for purposes of antidumping determinations. Id.
83. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iii) (1982) states:
"(iii) Impact on affected industry. In examining the impact on the affected industry, the
Commission shall evaluate all relevant economic factors which have a bearing on the state of
the industry." Id. See also Color Picture Tubes, supra note 81 at 7. In this report of a final
injury determination by the ITC the relevant economic factors used included capacity, pro-




87. Color Picture Tubes, supra note 81 at 6.
The Transnational Lawyer / VoL 2
employs,88 and the profitability of the industry. 9 In regard to the
foreign product, the ITC may also be required to cumulatively
appraise like product imports from two or more countries along with
the foreign product under consideration and weigh their effect upon
the domestic industry.9° The only time the ITC is required to apply
this comparison is if the imports are subject to investigation, are
marketed within a reasonable coincident period, and compete with
other imports as well as the domestic "like" product.9'
Finally, a strong causal link must be found between the dumping
of the foreign product and the material injury to the domestic
industry.92 The ITC must determine whether or not the domestic
industry has suffered injury "by reason of" the imports under
consideration. 93 This is an important step because the purpose of
antidumping law is to aid only those domestic industries that are
actually experiencing material injury caused by foreign imports. 94
The ITC is placed in an interesting dilemma when trying to
determine if the dumping of the foreign product has caused material
injury to the domestic industry. In determining causation, the ITC
must analyze three statutory factors provided by Congress. 95 How-
ever, nowhere in the statutes can language be found that instructs
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iv) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) states:
(iv) Cumulation. For purposes of clauses (i) and (ii), the Commission shall
cumulatively assess the volume and effect of imports from two or more countries
of like products subject to investigation if such imports compete with each other
and with like products of the domestic industry in the United States market.
Id.
91. Color Picture Tubes, supra note 81 at 9.
92. Color Picture Tubes, supra note 81 at 9 (Views of Vice Chairman Anne E. Brunsdale)
[hereinafter Brunsdale views].
93. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) states:
(2) the Commission determines that-
(A) an industry in the United States-
(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded,
by reason of imports of that merchandise.
Id. (emphasis added).
94. See supra note 10.
95. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(7)(C)(i), (ii), (iii) (1982) states:
The Commission shall consider, among other factors-
(i) the volume of imports of the merchandise which is the subject of the investigation,
(ii) the effect of imports of that merchandise on prices in the United States for like
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the ITC on how to consider and evaluate these factors. 96 Apparently,
Congress has expressly left the method of considering and evaluating
these factors to the discretion of the ITC.97 Congress stated that "the
determination of the ITC with respect to causation is ... complex
and difficult, and is a matter for the judgment of the ITC. ' '9 8 One
certainty is that while the ITC has discretion as to how to apply the
factors, it has the responsibility "to isolate the relevant impact of
dumped imports and then to assess whether that impact is material. '" 99
How the factors are applied by the ITC in making its causation
determination is entirely left to the discretion of the Commission
itself. 100
4. Agency Review of Final Determinations
After the ITC makes its final determination and concludes its
investigation, 10' the ITA will review the determination yearly'0 2 or
upon the request of the foreign manufacturer. 13 All determinations
are reviewed yearly so that duties can be adjusted pursuant to the
amount of dumping still occurring.' ° Because antidumping law is a
response to the unfair trade practices of foreign producers, if a
foreign producer ceases to dump its product in the United States, it
is no longer in violation of the law. 05 Hence, the Commerce De-
96. Brunsdale views, supra note 92, at 19.
97. Id. at 20.
98. SENATE COMM. ON FiNANcE, TRADE AGREEMENTs ACT oF 1979, S. REP. No. 96-249,
96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
99. Brunsdale views, supra note 92, at 21.
100. Id. at 20.
101. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see also supra note 78 and
accompanying text. After the ITC has made its final antidumping duty determination, the
ITA, as the "administering authority," will enforce a positive duty determination (e.g., decision
to place a tariff upon the dumped product) pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677(1) (1982).
102. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) states:
"(a) Periodic review of amount of duty. (1) In general. At least once during each 12-month
period beginning on the anniversary of the date of publication of... an antidumping
duty order ... the administering authority.., shall [review that antidumping order]."
Id.
103. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) states that: "Whenever the administering
authority or the Commission receives information concerning, or a request for the review
of,. . . an affirmative (antidumping) determination... ." Id. See also 19 C.F.R. § 207.45(b)(2)
(1988). It is important to note that if either the ITA or ITC comes across information on
their own that is sufficient to warrant a review, they may under take such a review without
any of the involved parties requesting it. Id.
104. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
105. See PATTiSON, supra note 3, at 1-4 1-11. "Dumping" is looked upon as a form of
price discrimination among national markets. The purpose of antidumping law is to rectify
the unfairness that occurs when a foreign product is sold at less than it should be in the
United States; thereby injuring the domestic producers of the same product. However, once
this unfairness has been rectified, then the antidumping duties should be lifted as they have
served their purpose. Id.
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partment's yearly reviews of its antidumping determinations affords
the Department a chance to determine if the foreign producer is still
injuring a domestic industry by dumping its product in the United
States.
When a party requests a review by either the ITA or ITC of a
previous Commerce Department determination, that request must
show "changed circumstances" sufficient to warrant such a review.0 6
The party seeking to persuade the Commerce Department of changed
circumstances carries the burden of persuasion."07 If either the ITC
or the ITA decides that there are sufficient changed circumstances
to warrant a review, that agency then considers whether, in the light
of the changed circumstances, the current duty remains necessary to
keep the foreign industry from injuring the domestic industry.0 8 If
this is decided in the negative, the duty is revoked." 9 If it is
determined that the duty remains necessary, the duty is not revoked." 0
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Deference to Commerce Department Decisions
Judicial review is an effective deterrent to arbitrary administrative
action.' While the Commerce Department may possess the expertise" 2
in handling matters dealing with international trade, justice requires
an impartial examination of its determinations upon the request of
an aggrieved party.113 For persons adversely affected by agency action,
U.S. law creates a statutory right to judicial review." 4 The right
arises from the basic presumption that judicial review should be
106. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) states: "the [ITC or ITA] shall consider
whether, in the light of changed circumstances, an agreement ... continues to eliminate
completely the injurious effects of imports of the merchandise." (emphasis added) Id.
107. Avesta AB v. United States, 689 F. Supp. 1173, 1181 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
108. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
109. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(e) (1982).
110. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
111. Re, supra note 2, at 175.
112. Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 673 F. Supp. 454, 463 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), in
agreement with Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. United States, 750 F.2d 927, 933 (Fed.
Cir. 1984), discussing the CIT's scope of judicial review and pointed out that the administrative
agency "has broad discretion in the enforcement of the trade laws and its decision does not
depend on the weight of the evidence but rather on its expert judgment." Hercules at 463.
113. Re, supra note 2, at 174.
114. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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available to those who have suffered a legal wrong or who have been
adversely affected by administrative action.' 5
Since its inception, the CIT has come under fire for its alleged
deference to Commerce Department determinations.11 6 The CIT has
a very strict judicial review mandate"7 that gives the appearance of
rendering the court almost completely powerless to do anything but
agree with Commerce Department determinations. Four recent anti-
dumping cases, however, shed some light on the CIT's power of
review and provide insight into how the court can, in fact, provide
an effective forum for the review of Commerce Department action." 8
The CIT in Atcor, Inc. v. United States"9 upheld a final deter-
mination by the ITA not to impose a duty upon Indian producers
of steel pipe. 120 The ITA determined that the Indian steel pipe was
not being sold in the United States at less than fair market value'2'
and, therefore, was not being dumped in the United States.'2 The
ITA came to this conclusion by adding two domestic Indian taxes
to the United States price.'2 The Indian government exempted the
Indian producers of steel pipe from the domestic tax because the
115. Id.; see also Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1511
(1967).
116. See Kennedy, supra note 4. The author came to the conclusion that the degree to
which the CIT deferred to agency determinations was tantamount to abdication of the judicial
review process. The author reviewed three cases which were decided in 1983, 1984, and 1985
noting that in each case the CIT failed to effectively review the cases for agency error. See
Consumer Products Division, SCM Corp. v. Silver Reed America, Inc. 732 F.2d 1033 (Fed.
Cir. 1985); Melamine Chemicals, Inc. v. United States, 732 F.2d 924 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Smith-
Corona Group v. United States 713 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
117. See supra note 47 for text of 28 U.S.C. 1581 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See also supra
text accompanying notes 12-15.
118. See Atcor, Inc. v. United States, 658 F. Supp. 295 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987); Hercules,
Inc. v. United States, 673 F. Supp. 454 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987); East Chilliwack Fruit Growers
Co-operative v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 499 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987); Zenith Electronics
Corporation v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1382 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986).
119. Alcor, 658 F. Supp. at 295.
120. Id. at 296-97. The Standard Pipe and Tube Subcommittee of the Committee on Pipe
and Tube Imports (a private trade association) along with member companies who produce
steel pipe filed a petition with the ITA contending imports of pipe and tube from India were
being, or were likely to be sold, in the United States at less than fair market value. The ITA
initiated an antidumping investigation and the ITC determined that there was a reasonable
indication that material injury to the domestic producers of steel pipe might occur. In its final
determination, the ITA ruled that standard pipe and tube from India was not being sold in
the United States at less "than fair market value. The plaintiffs in this action challenged the
ITA's addition of two domestic Indian taxes to the final calculation of the steel's United
States price. Id.
121. Fair market value for foreign products is determined by looking to the price of the
commodity in the country in which it is produced. PAxnsoN, supra note 3, at 1-4 n. 2.
122. Atcor, 658 F. Supp. at 296.
123. The U. S. price is defined in 19 U.S.C. § 1673 as "... the purchase price, or the
exporter's sales price, of the merchandise, whichever is appropriate." Id.
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steel pipe was being exported.- The ITA determined the fair market
value of the steel by adding the uncollected taxes to the production
price.-25 The ITA argued that the adjustment was correct because it
was in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(1)(C). 19 U.S.C. §
1677a(d)(1)(C) requires that the ITA add to the United States price
of the exporter's product any tax not imposed upon the exporter
because the product was exported.1 6 Had the taxes not been added
to the United States price, the pipe would have been sold at less
than its fair market value in the United States, thereby creating a
dumping margin. 27 As a result, the ITA would have imposed a duty
on the Indian producer if the fair market value was more than the
United States price.128 If the ITA had not added the foreign taxes to
the United States price, its determination would clearly have been
overturned by the CIT.
In upholding the determination of the ITA, the CIT in Atcor
concluded that its statutorily defined scope of review12 9 permitted
only limited review of the ITA record and that much deference was
to be afforded the expertise of that body in the administration of
antidumping law. 30 The CIT held that in reviewing agency determi-
124. The first tax is a Steel Development Fund levy which is added to each ton of steel
sold by the Steel Authority of India. The second tax is a 4% ad valorem central sales tax.
Atcor, Inc. v. United States, 658 F. Supp. 295, 297 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987). When the duty is
levied in the form of a percentage of the value of the property, this is known as ad valorem
duty. BLACK's LAW DICTiONARY 48 (5th ed. 1979).
125. Atcor, 658 F. Supp. at 297.
126. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(1)(C) (1982) states:
d) Adjustments to purchase price and exporter's sales price - the purchase price and
the exporter's sales price shall be adjusted by being (1) increased by -
(C) the amount of any taxes imposed in the country of exportation directly upon
the exported merchandise or components thereof, which have been rebated, or which
have not been collected, by reason of the exportation of the merchandise to the
United States, but only to the extent that such taxes are added to or included in the
price of such or similar merchandise when sold in the country of exportation; ....
Id. (emphasis added).
127. The dumping margin is equal to the amount of the difference between the fair market
value of the country of origin and the price of the commodity in the United States. PATIOrsN,
supra note 3, at 1-4 n.2.
128. See generally Atcor, Inc. v. United States, 658 F. Supp. 295, 297 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1987). For example, if it cost the Indian government $100(US) per yard to produce the steel
(equalling its FMV), but the purchase price in the United States which most likely would equal
the exporter's sales price was $80(US) per yard (equalling its USP) then, according to standard
antidumping law, there would be a dumping margin of $20(US) which would result in a
coinciding duty being placed on the Indian steel. In Atcor, the ITA calculated into the USP
two Indian taxes that were not collected as a result of the steel's exportation. This action was
in conformity with the statute and had the effect of raising the USP to eradicate the dumping
margin). Id.
129. See Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 201, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980).
130. Atcor, 658 F. Supp. at 299.
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nations, evidence outside the record may not be received.' 3' Conse-
quently, the court must base its decision upon the record as articulated
by the agency and not substitute its own reasoning based on evidence
not contained in the agency record. 32
In Atcor, the CIT also held that agency determinations on the
value of merchandise are presumed correct because of the expertise
of the ITA regarding valuation issues. 33 However, this presumption
can be rebutted by a showing that the ITA incorrectly interpreted a
statute. 34 The CIT recognized that the its deference to Commerce
Department expertise did not extend into the area of statutory
interpretation. 35 The CIT concluded, however, that the ITA's inter-
pretation of 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(1)(C) was consistent with prior
case law 36 and with the legislative history of the statute. 137
The underlying rationale of the CIT's holdings in Atcor relies on
the expertise of the Commerce Department in the administration of
antidumping law. 3 The result evidences a high degree of deference
by the CIT to Commerce Department antidumping determinations.139
Thus, the message is clear that while the CIT does provide a forum
for parties adversely affected by Commerce Department determina-
tions, the CIT will grant extreme deference to the Commerce De-
partment's expertise in the administration of antidumping law.
As previously alluded to, the CIT is not allowed to rely upon its
own post-hoc rationalizations in reviewing antidumping determina-
tions."4° When the CIT reviews a Commerce Department antidumping
131. Id. at 300. Had the court not taken this position, figures not used by the ITA in
making its determination could have been used by the CIT in making its conclusion. However,
this would not be logical for two reasons: (1) as a judicial entity, the CIT lacks the expertise
in dealing with trade figures to the extent required to make a fair antidumping determination
and, (2) the CIT's purpose is to review the rationale articulated by the agency and decipher
whether or not the agency used proper reasoning to come to a proper conclusion. Only if the
agency's determination is unsupported by the evidence or plainly against the law will the CIT
overturn the decision. But even when that occurs, it will generally send the matter back to the
agency for a re-working in accordance with the law. Id. at 299-300.
132. Atcor, Inc., v. United States, 658 F. Supp. 295, 300 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
133. Id. See also F.W. Myers & Co., Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 360 (Cust. Ct.
1974).
134. Atcor, 658 F. Supp. at 300.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 302. See also Roquette Freres v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 599 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1984); See also Zenith Electronics Corp. v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1382 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1986).
137. Atcor, Inc. v. United States, 658 F. Supp. 295, 302 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987). Congress
stated that dumping margins should not arise merely because taxes are collected on home
market sales but not on export sales. Id.
138. Id at 299.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 300.
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determination it is primarily concerned with whether the agency's
reasoning is based on facts that reasonably point to its conclusions.
This mode of analysis was evident in Hercules, Inc. v. United States 41
in which the CIT analyzed a final antidumping determination by the
ITA using the "substantial evidence test". 42 The test, which provides
two ways that an agency determination may be deemed unlawful by
the CIT, is essentially a label placed upon its statutorily given
standard of review. In short, the test provides that a Commerce
Department determination will be overturned if it is found to be
unsupported by a substantial amount of available evidence or if it is
not in accordance with the law. 4
In Hercules, both the foreign and domestic producers disagreed
with the final determination made by the ITA.' 44 Among its many
contentions, the French producer argued that the ITA failed to make
adjustments for differences in levels of trade between France and the
United States as required by 19 C.F.R. § 353.l19.14 The ITA con-
tended that the French producer did not provide any verifiable or
credible evidence to warrant a different determination on the mat-
ter.' 46 In its analysis, the CIT noted that the "substantial evidence
test" provided a strict scope of judicial review that requires the court
to give much deference to Commerce Department determinations. 47
141. Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 673 F. Supp. 454 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
142. 19 U.S.C. § 1516(b)(1)(B) (1982) contains the test which states:
"(b) Standards of review. (1) Remedy. The court shall hold unlawful any determination,
finding, or conclusion found -
(B) ... to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise
not in accordance with law." Id.
The CIT held the "substantial evidence test" to mean "such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Hercules, 673 F. Supp. at 463.
143. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
144. Hercules, 673 F. Supp. at 484. The ITA determined that the industrial nitrocellulose
from France was being sold in the United States at less than fair value. Id.
145. Id. at 486. See also 19 C.F.R. § 353.19 (1988) which states:
The comparison of the United States price with the applicable price in the market
of the country of exportation ... generally will be made at the same commercial
level of trade. However, if it is found that the sales of the merchandise to the
United States or in the applicable foreign market at the same commercial level of
trade are insufficient in number to permit an adequate comparison, the comparison
will be made at the nearest comparable commercial level of trade ...
Id.
146. Hercules, Inc. v. United States 673 F. Supp. 454, 486 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987). The
ITA stated that France had not established that the differences in the prices of the product in
France, as compared to the United States, was a result of differences in the cost of selling at
one level of trade as compared to the other. Id. 19 C.F.R. § 353.19 requires the ITA to make
comparisons on the nearest comparable level of trade only if it finds that the sales in the
United States market or the applicable foreign market are insufficient in number at the same
level to permit an adequate comparison of the two products. Id.
147. Hercules, 673 F. Supp. at 486.
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Ultimately, the CIT upheld the ITA's position stating that "it is this
court's duty upon a review of a determination by [the] Commerce
[Department], which interprets and implements a regulation, to sus-
tain the determination if 'it is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation.' 148 This holding illustrates once again that the
CIT, while looking for misapplication of law by the Commerce
Department in antidumping investigations, is not going to micro-
scopically scrutinize the ITA's application of antidumping law. Con-
trary to the constitutional mandate that the judiciary is the final
authority on issues of statutory interpretation, 149 the deference of the
CIT to Commerce Department expertise appears to have infiltrated
that realm of the court's existence as well.
As in Atcor, Zenith Electronics Corporation v. United States'5 °
involved a challenge to the ITA's interpretation of a statute.',' In
Zenith, the ITA interpreted 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(1)(C) 5 2 as calling
for the subtraction of non-collected Japanese commodity taxes from
the fair market value of the Japanese television sets. 53 As a result,
the ITA concluded that the sixteen Japanese television manufacturers
were not dumping their television sets in the United States 54 The
difference between the adjusted fair market value of the Japanese
televisions and the cost of the televisions in the United States was
held to be at most de minimis.' 5
The plaintiffs in Zenith (various American television manufactur-
ers) 56 successfully challenged the statutory interpretation of the ITA
in this case. 57 They were successful because the CIT found that the
148. Id. at 488.
149. See supra note 2.
150. Zenith Electronics Corporation v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1382 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1986).
151. Id. at 1383. The Independent Radionic Workers of America, along with three unions
representing American workers, engaged in the production of American television sets contested
the final determination of the Commerce Department that 16 Japanese television manufacturers
were not dumping their televisions in the United States. The determination stated that either
there was no dumping of televisions or that the dumping margins were de minimis. Id.
152. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(1)(C) (1982) requires the ITA to increase the exporter's sales
price by the amount of any taxes not collected because the merchandise was exported to the
United States. Id.
153. Zenith, 633 F. Supp. at 1388. Japan did not collect the commodity taxes because the
televisions were exported. Id.
154. Id.
155. Zenith Electronics Corporation v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1382, 1383 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1987). The ITA concluded that the dumping margins did not exceed 0.086% ad valorem
weighted average margin. Id.
156. Id. at 1382. Specifically, the plaintiffs were an American manufacturer of television
sets and three unions representing American workers engaged in television manufacturing. Id.
157. Id.
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ITA's use of 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(1)(C) was inconsistent with the
express wording of the statute.158 The language of the statute expressly
states that the adjustment to be made when the foreign tax goes
uncollected is to add the non-collected tax to the United States price
of the product. 59 The court stated that the ITA did not add uncol-
lected foreign taxes when calculating the U.S. price of the product,
thereby failing to follow the mandate of 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(1)(C). 16
As a result, the CIT held that the ITA abused its discretion in coming
to a final determination without correctly applying the statute and
remanded the case to the agency to correct the miscalculations. 16'
Zenith'62 serves to clarify the lessons learned from both Atcor 63
and Hercules.'6 It can be concluded from these decisions that the
CIT will not overturn a Commerce Department determination that
rests squarely within the bounds of the law. It is equally obvious
that the court will defer to the expertise of the Commerce Department
in the field of antidumping law, particularly with respect to those
issues left open by the statutes themselves. 65 However, guided by the
constitutional mandate that the judiciary is the final authority on
issues of statutory interpretation,'" the CIT will not defer to mis-
construed statutory interpretations by the Commerce Department that
are contrary to Congressional intent. 67 Again, while on its face this
mandate seems to provide the CIT with complete control over the
interpretation of antidumping statutes, as Hercules appears to dem-
onstrate, this might not be the case. 68.
As the CIT in Atcor aptly pointed out, the court is only permitted
to review the agency record itself. 69 The plaintiffs in East Chilliwack
158. Id. at 1389.
159. Id. See also 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(1)(C) (1982).
160. Zenith Electronics Corporation v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1382, 1384 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1987).
161. Id. at 1402.
162. Id. at 1382.
163. Atcor, Inc. v. United States, 658 F. Supp. 295 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
164. Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 673 F. Supp. 454 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
165. Zenith Electronics Corporation v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1382, 1389 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1986). The court is referring to the myriad of statutes that govern the Commerce
Department's administration of antidumping law. The court also refers to the fact that one
of the purposes of administrative agencies is to fill in the "gaps" between Congressional law




168. Atcor, Inc. v. United States, 658 F. Supp. 295, 299 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
169. Id.
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Fruit Growers Co-operative v. United States170 moved for a judgment
on the administrative record 171 contending that the ITA used calcu-
lations outside of the record in coming to its final determination. 172
The United States, while conceding that some mathematical errors
were made 73 argued that revising the administrative record would
not reduce the dumping margin as the plaintiffs claimed. 74 In its
analysis, the court recognized that judicial review of Commerce
Department determinations is restricted to the administrative record
and that such record cannot be supplemented by any party; partic-
ularly after the Commerce Department issues a certificate of
completeness' 75 of the record. 176 As a result of this reasoning, the
court upheld the determination of the ITA despite the admitted
inequities in the administrative record. '77 The court did concede,
however, that if the plaintiffs could show facts and circumstances
that warranted extraordinary relief, they could add to the record any
revised calculations.178
East Chilliwack appears to provide the litigant with another avenue
for challenging a Commerce Department determination. Aside from
attacking the statutory interpretation of the Commerce Department
or showing a clearly erroneous application of antidumping law, if a
litigant can prove to the court that the Commerce Department's
determination was made using calculations or evidence outside the
administrative record, and can prove that the use of the outside
170. East Chilliwack Fruit Growers Co-operative v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 499 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1987).
171. After an issue is joined in any action in which a party believes that the determination
of the court is to be made solely upon the basis of the record made before an agency, that
party may move for judgment in its favor upon all or any part of the agency determination.
See U.S. CT. INT. TaDn RuLE 56.1(a).
172. Chilliwack, 655 F. Supp. at 502.
173. Id. at 501. The United States conceded that there was (1) a misapplication of the
exchange rate from Canadian to American dollars in determining East Chilliwack's fair market
value (e.g., its price in Canada) and, (2) a miscomparison of home market sales in which
packing costs were deducted from the original cost of production which did include packing
costs. Id.
174. Id.
175. The certificate of completeness is a certified record of the ITA's decision including
the evidence it relied on provided to the CIT so that it can adequately review the agency's
decision. U.S. CT. INT. TRADE RUE 71(a)(3). East Chilliwack Fruit Growers Co-operative v.
United States, 655 F. Supp. 499, 502 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
176. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(2)(A) (1982); U.S. CT. INT. TRADE RULE 71(a)(3). See also
Former Employees of Delco Systems Operations, Culpeper, Virginia v. United States, 685 F.
Supp. 1263, 1264 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988) (The CIT may not consider information that was not
part of the record before the Agency).
177. Chilliwack, 655 F. Supp. at 502.
178. Id.
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information had an extraordinary effect upon the litigant, he or she
might be allowed to supplement the agency record. 79 Had the plain-
tiffs in East Chilliwack shown, for example, that because of the
ITA's miscalculations a duty was placed upon their product that
made it unprofitable to sell that product in the United States, such
a showing of material injury8° might have been enough to persuade
the court to allow the record to reflect the revised calculations.' 8'
Such a revised record could go a long way in persuading the CIT to
overturn a Commerce Department determination or, at the very least,
could cause the CIT to remand the case to the agency for a redeter-
mination using the revised record. 82
The above cases serve to define for the transnational practitioner
the scope of the CIT's power to review the Commerce Department's
antidumping determinations. Initially, the CIT will defer to the
expertise of the Commerce Department by limiting its review to the
agency record and by deferring to Commerce Department determi-
nations that deal with issues left open by the antidumping statutes
themselves. While the CIT will not overturn a determination that lies
squarely within the boundaries of the law, the court will overturn
determinations that do not follow from proper statutory construction.
Through its constitutional mandate the CIT, as an Article III court,
is the final authority on how a statute is to be interpreted. 83 However,
a determination that is not "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation" will be upheld.'1 As alluded to earlier, this language
seems to shed some doubt as to whether or not the CIT truly is the
final authority on statutory interpretation.'85 Finally, the CIT will
allow a party to supplement the agency record during judicial review
if it can be shown that the Commerce Department relied on evidence
outside the agency record but only if such reliance has an extraor-
dinary effect upon that party.
179. Id.
180. The term "material injury" means harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or
unimportant. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
181. East Chilliwack Fruit Growers Co-operative v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 499, 502
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
182. Id.
183. Article III of the United States Constitution provides that "The judicial power of the
United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. COzNST. art. III, cl. I (emphasis
added).
184. Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 673 F. Supp. 454, 488 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
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B. The CIT and Residual Jurisdiction
Residual jurisdiction provides the Court of International Trade
with jurisdiction over Commerce Department activities related to
antidumping in addition to its "traditional" jurisdiction in this
area.186 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the CIT can invoke residual
jurisdiction in two circumstances: (1) to force the Commerce De-
partment to abide by its own time limitations in the administration
of antidumping law; and (2) to challenge adverse preliminary admin-
istrative decisions by the Commerce Department that specifically
relate to antidumping. 8 7 Residual jurisdiction lies only when no other
subsection of § 1581 supports jurisdiction or when the remedy
provided under any other subsection is manifestly inadequate.1 8
The value of residual jurisdiction is evident from the holding of
Nakajima All Co., Ltd. v. United States.8 9 In Nakajima, the CIT
invoked residual jurisdiction to review an original antidumping de-
termination by the ITA. 190 Since 1983, the ITA had failed to publish
preliminary and final determinations of its yearly reviews of Naka-
186. See supra note 47 for text of 28 U.S.C. § 1581 containing the statement of the CIT's
jurisdiction.
187. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) states:
(i) In addition to the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of International Trade
by (this statute) .... the Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction
of any action commenced against the United States ... that arises out of any law
of the United States providing for -
(I) revenue from imports or tonnage;
(2) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of merchandise for
reasons other than the raising of revenue;
(3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the importation of merchandise
for reasons other than the protection of the public health or safety; or
(4) administration and enforcement with respect to the matters referred to in
paragraphs (1)-(3) of this subsection and (a)-(h) of this section.
Id.
See also Nakajima All Co. Ltd. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 52 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988)
(discussing the application of residual jurisdiction to encourage the ITA to maintain its own
time frame in the administration of antidumping law). See also Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A.
v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 1450 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986) (discussing the use of residual
jurisdiction to challenge a Commerce Department's preliminary administrative decision).
188. Nakajima, 682 F. Supp. at 57.
189. Id. at 52.
190. Id. at 54. The plaintiffs were Japanese manufacturers of portable electric typewriters.
The ITA conducted eight yearly preliminary and final reviews since the original 1980 deter-
mination but had concluded only the first three. The plaintiffs initiated the action asking the
court to issue an order compelling the ITA to finish and publish its preliminary and final
determinations for the last five years. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider
the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). Ultimately, the court did not grant the order because the
Commerce Department agreed to complete its review in a swift manner. Id.
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jima's imports. 191 The failure to publish the final determinations gave
the CIT grounds to invoke residual jurisdiction since the CIT could
not review the agency's action under its traditional mode of juris-
diction without a final determination by the Commerce Depart-
ment.192
Relying on the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the CIT
held that this case presented a proper instance to invoke residual
jurisdiction. 19 3 Congress made it clear that the CIT can invoke its
residual jurisdiction and entertain a civil action relating to anti-
dumping as long as the court is not given jurisdiction over the matter
under any other subsection of 28 U.S.C. § 1581.194 In Nakajima,
since the traditional modes of jurisdiction' 95 did not provide a basis
for the court's jurisdiction and because the case involved an anti-
dumping proceeding, it was appropriate for the CIT to invoke
residual jurisdiction and hear the plaintiff's grievance.196
Residual jurisdiction provides an effective means for enforcing
time limitations placed on the ITA in its yearly review of antidumping
determinations. 197 If a litigant could not seek judicial review of an
original Commerce Department determination until after the ITA
completed its yearly review of that determination, then the ITA could
effectively preclude any reviewoof such original determinations by
not completing its statutorily mandated yearly determinations. 98 In
191. For a discussion of the Commerce Department's yearly determinations, see 19 U.S.C.
§ 1675(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Essentially, the ITA will review its final determination
yearly to correct or alleviate duties if circumstances have changed to warrant it. Id.
192. It is important to note that under 28 U.S.C. § 1581, the CIT is only allowed to
review final determinations by the ITA. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (c) (19 U.S.C. § 1516a) allows
the CIT to review preliminary injury determination by the ITC. Id.
193. Nakajima All Co. Ltd. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 52, 57-58 n.3.
194. Id. Although the focus of this article is limited, the CIT is not strictly bound to
antidumping and countervailing duty cases. The CIT entertains cases dealing with trademark
infringement, import restrictions, as well as agency actions of the Secretary of Labor, Secretary
of Commerce, and Secretary of the Treasury. See Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-417, § 201, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980).
195. It is important to note that neither §1516a or §1581 of the Customs Courts Act of
1980 provide for a challenge to the "slowness" of the Commerce Department in issuing its
determinations. This, taken together with Congress' intent to provide the CIT with the ability
to entertain a civil action relating to antidumping through §1581(i) when jurisdiction is not
available under the other statutes, provides the backbone of the court's ultimate conclusion in
Nakajima. See Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 201, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980).
196. Nakajima, 682 F. Supp. at 54. The CIT was able to persuade the ITA to complete
its reviews quickly. Id.
197. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) provides that within one year of the
initiation of the review, the Secretary will issue final results. Id.
198. UST, Inc., et al v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 1, 2-3 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986). In this
case the CIT held that the ITA's defense to the action (e.g., that it had not issued a final
determination and therefore, the CIT did not have jurisdiction over the action) was invalid.
The court made the point that the ITA or ITC might never make a final determination if it
could not be touched by judicial review. Id.
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Nakajima, the importer would have been effectively barred from
judicial review had residual jurisdiction not been available. If the
importer had been excluded, the legislative mandate of the CIT could
not have been completely fulfilled. 19
The residual jurisdiction of the CIT has also been invoked by the
court in antidumping proceedings challenging certain preliminary
administrative decisions by the Commerce Department which occur
before any final determinations on injury or dumping are made.200
In Nissan Motor Corp. In The U.S.A. v. United States20 the ITA,
in 1980, conducted a yearly review pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1675 of
an antidumping determination made by the Treasury Department in
1976.202 That review revealed that the plaintiffs were no longer
dumping their product (tapered roller bearings) in the domestic
market.20 1 In 1986, the ITA initiated a new administrative review of
the 1976 Treasury Department antidumping determination and re-
quested that plaintiffs answer lengthy questionnaires pursuant to that
review. 204 The plaintiffs argued that had the ITA actually revoked
the Treasury Department's antidumping finding (as it had tentatively
decided to do in 1984 after finally publishing its preliminary results
from the 1980 review), then it would not have had the authority to
conduct the new review and subject the plaintiffs to the question-
naires. 2 5
In invoking its residual jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's claims,
the CIT held that the ITA's decision to initiate the new administrative
review was the type of preliminary administrative decision over which
199. Re, supra note 2 at 174. Congress created the CIT for the purpose of providing
persons adversely affected by administrative actions related to international trade the same
access to judicial review as persons aggrieved by other agency actions. Id.
200. See Interredec, Inc. v. U.S., 652 F. Supp. 1550 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987). In this case
the CIT invoked residual jurisdiction to challenge the ITA's decision not to conduct a yearly
review of an antidumping determination. The court used its residual jurisdiction to force the
ITA, via the issuance of an injunction, to make its yearly determination. The plaintiffs
challenged a preliminary administrative decision by the ITA not to conduct its yearly investi-
gation through the use of the CIT's residual jurisdiction. Id.
201. Nissan Motor Corp. In U.S.A. v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 1450 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1986). In 1976 the Treasury Department published an antidumping finding covering the
plaintiff's product. However, in 1980 when the Commerce Department assumed responsibility
for administration of the antidumping laws the ITA published its intent to conduct its annual
review of the antidumping findings pursuant to § 751 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.
No reviews were ever administered so the Commerce Department did not have its own final
determination on the books. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1453.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1453.
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the court could use its residual jurisdiction. 206 Since the ITA's decision
to initiate the new investigation arose before any final determination
was made by the ITA based on its yearly administrative review of
the Treasury Department determination, the traditional modes of the
CIT's jurisdiction were not available. 207 Therefore, because of the
decision by the ITA to initiate a new administrative review related
to antidumping duty proceedings, residual jurisdiction was available
to the court under § 1581(i). 20
Residual jurisdiction provides parties who are adversely affected
by Commerce Department actions in the area of antidumping with
the ability to challenge those actions that otherwise would be unrev
iewable under the CIT's traditional modes of jurisdiction. Residual
jurisdiction can be used to force the Commerce Department to act
in a timely manner to complete its yearly reviews or to challenge a
preliminary administrative decision. In these ways, residual jurisdic-
tion is a valuable tool to the transnational practitioner who might
have a valid claim involving such issues.
CONCLUSION
While the CIT provides a valuable forum for the judicial review
of Commerce Department decisions relating to antidumping issues,
the transnational practitioner should also note that the court provides
a judicial forum for the adjudication of international disputes in
areas such as trademark infringement and import restrictions. The
CIT also plays an important role in the evaluation of administrative
determinations made by the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of
Commerce, and the Secretary of the Treasury.20
While the expertise of the Commerce Department in administering
antidumping law is a paramount consideration of the CIT, the court
stands on its constitutional mandate as being the final authority on
statutory interpretation. 2 0 A transnational practitioner who wishes to
206. Nissan Motor Corp. In U.S.A. v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 1450, 1453 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1986).
207. 28 U.S.C. § 1581 and 19 U.S.C. § 1516a which is contained within the former statute
at paragraph (c). The CIT's "traditional" modes of jurisdiction require a final determination
by the Commerce Department before a review can be commenced. Id.
208. See supra note 186 for text of 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
209. Although this article focusses on the CIT's role in the judicial review of antidumping
determinations by the Commerce Department, the CIT's scope of review is not strictly limited
to such determinations. See Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 201, 94 Stat.
1727 (1980).
210. See supra text accompanying notes 141-149.
252
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successfully challenge a final determination made by the Commerce
Department in the area of antidumping must meet the threshold
standard as delineated in Hercules, Inc. v. United States.21' The litigant
must establish that the Commerce Department's interpretation of a
statute was "plainly erroneous" or "inconsistent" with the statute
itself. If the threshold is met, the CIT will overturn the antidumping
determination and instruct the Commerce Department to apply the
statute in the proper manner.212 Although the CIT is empowered as
the final authority on statutory interpretation in this area, the deci-
sions of the CIT appear to give a high degree of deference to the
expertise of the Commerce Department, even in the area of statutory
interpretation of antidumping law. 213
The CIT also appears quite willing to overturn a Commerce
Department determination that is not supported by a substantial
amount of evidence. In this connection, the CIT will affirm the
agency's determination only where there is enough evidence from the
original agency record that a reasonable mind might accept as ade-
quate to support the agency's conclusions. 214 Normally, the CIT will
only review that evidence which is part of the original agency record.
If it can be shown that the Commerce Department relied on evidence
that was not contained in the original agency record and that this
reliance had an "extraordinary" effect upon a party to the deter-
mination, then the CIT has the power to review that outside evidence
by making it a part of the agency record. 215
The transnational practitioner should also be aware of the utility
of the CIT's residual jurisdiction. Simply put, residual jurisdiction
provides the transnational practitioner with an additional avenue to
challenge Commerce Department antidumping determinations. Resid-
ual jurisdiction enables the CIT to obtain jurisdiction over actions
concerning preliminary Commerce Department decisions on antid-
umping issues and over actions concerning the Commerce Depart-
ment's failure to follow its own statutory guidelines in the
administration of antidumping law. Residual jurisdiction may only
be invoked when the CIT's "traditional" statutory jurisdiction 21 6 is
211. Hercules, Inc. v. United States,, 673 F. Supp. 454, 488 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 141-149.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 165-167, discussing statutory interpretation.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 142-143, discussing the substantial evidence test.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 177-182, discussing addition of outside evidence
to the agency record.
216. Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 201, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980).
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unavailable or when the remedy provided thereunder is manifestly
inadequate. 21 7
Where does the CIT go from here? The passage of the 1980 Act
was an attempt by Congress to provide an effective forum for judicial
review of agency determinations specifically related to international
trade issues. Due to the increased participation by the United States
in international trade over the last decade, the major focus of the
CIT has shifted from classification and valuation cases to antidump-
ing litigation. One can only speculate as to what the CIT's focus
might be in the years to come. It appears that as long as the United
States keeps its doors open to foreign participation in its markets,
the CIT will continue to provide a valuable service to the international
trade community.
Karl Richard Tucker
217. See supra text accompanying notes 185-205, discussing residual jurisdiction.
